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WHAT'S WRONG WITH OUR TALK ABOUT 
RACE? ON HISTORY, PARTICULARITY, 
AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
James Boyd White* 
One of the striking and original achievements of the Michigan 
Law Review in its first century was the publication in 1989 of a 
Symposium entitled Legal Storytelling. 1 Organized by the remarkable 
editor-in-chief, Kevin Kennedy - who tragically died not long after 
his graduation - the Symposium not only brought an important topic 
to the forefront of legal thinking, it did so in an extraordinarily inter-
esting way. For this was not a mere collection of papers; the authors 
met in small editorial groups to discuss their work in detail, and as a 
result the whole project has a remarkable coherence and depth. In this 
Essay I shall build on the idea of that Symposium, but do so in a rather 
different way from any of those who wrote for it. 
I. 
People sometimes talk as though narrative is invariably a liberating 
or "subversive" mode of thought, when of course this is not so: stories 
can be as authoritarian, reactionary, closed-minded, and self-satisfied 
as any other form of discourse.2 But I think it is also true that the nar-
rative imagination has its own ways of working that can in some ways 
be inconsistent with more theoretical or abstract forms of speech.3 
Sometimes you find as you tell a story that it takes on a life of its 
own, leading you to places you had not imagined and presenting 
* L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of English, and Adjunct Profes-
sor of Classical Studies, University of Michigan. A.B. 1960, Amherst; A.M. 1961, LL.B. 1964, 
Harvard. - Ed. I want to thank the following people who have given careful and helpful 
readings to earlier drafts and helped with bibliographical suggestions too: Milner Ball, 
Sherman Clark, Alice Fulton, Don Herzog, James Jackson, Richard Lempert, Sabine 
MacCormack, Bruce Mannheim, Deborah Malamud, Robert Nagel, Jefferson Powell, 
Rebecca Scott, Joseph Vining, Catherine White, Emma White, Mary White, and Christina 
Whitman. I have often followed their suggestions, but sometimes not, and in any event none 
of them is responsible in any way for my errors or misjudgments. Since the University of 
Michigan is involved in litigation over its affirmative action programs I should also say, what 
should go without saying, that I speak only for myself and not the University or its Law 
School. 
1. 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). 
2. For an elaboration, see L. H. LaRue, Stories versus Theories, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
121, 134-36 (1992). 
3. See J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 858-926 (1973). 
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problems of which you had been not consciously aware. This often 
happens, to take an extremely minor example, in the drafting of law 
school examinations, and I think it happens in larger and more impor-
tant ways as well. Think, for example, of Huckleberry Finn. My sense 
is that in shifting from the traditional third-person narrator, as used in 
Tom Sawyer, to writing in the voice of an utterly marginal boy called 
Huckleberry, Twain was mainly thinking of the comic and satiric pos-
sibilities of the shift. Huck is a social idiot who perceives everything in 
a kind of mixed literal and superstitious way: his ignorance of what we 
all know makes him look foolish, but his fresh perceptions of the silli-
nesses of our world often make us look foolish too. As I imagine it, 
under Twain's original plan, the use of the first-person narrator would 
allow the reader and author alike to feel comfortably superior both to 
Huck and to the Mississippi River town of Petersburg. 
But as the story proceeds it gets out of control: Huck becomes a 
center of moral life; his friendship with Jim is real - by far the best 
thing in his life; and Jim himself comes to be seen as a person of ex-
traordinary moral and emotional quality, able to help Huck grow and 
change. I will not now rehearse the familiar story, but want only to 
point out that after the famous moment in Chapter 16 at which Huck 
refuses to turn Jim in to the slave-hunters, the novel comes to a halt. 
Huck has come to recognize that Jim is his friend, in a real sense the 
only friend he has ever had, and Twain has no way to imagine the next 
step in their story. In fact, he stopped writing the book at this point, 
and when he came back to it three years later he was able to proceed 
only by separating Huck and Jim and by presenting Huck as though he 
did not know what he learned in Chapter 16. It turns out that there is 
no way Twain can imagine the relation between this boy and this man 
in the social world in which they are placed, the only social world 
available. I think we could not imagine a life for them in that world ei-
ther, and that this is a fact full of the deepest social significance.4 
In one sense, I suppose, this was a real surprise to Twain, a frustra-
tion of his comic and satiric intentions. In another sense it was of 
course no surprise at all, for the story came from within Twain as an 
expression of a deep and troubling truth at the center of his own expe-
rience. 
II. 
I mean all of this as prelude to an effort of my own to raise a ques-
tion with which my own imagination, and I think that of the law, can-
not adequately deal, namely, the meaning of what we in our world call 
"race," especially in the context of "affirmative action." Race is of 
4. For a fuller statement of what I suggest about Huckleberry Finn, see my recent book 
THE EDGE OF MEANING 28-49 (2001 ). 
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course the topic on which Huckleberry Finn ran aground, and I think 
we do too - or at least I do. I believe a large part of the problem is 
the way we tell the story of race in our culture, so in a small way I shall 
carry forward the theme of the Symposium to which I referred at the 
outset, where several of the writers - Patricia Williams, David Luban, 
Milner Ball, Mari Matsuda, Derrick Bell, Richard Delgado, and Clark 
Cunningham - spoke specifically to narratives about race in America. 
At the same time I shall engage in more analytic modes of thought as 
well, though these turn out to have the property that stories often 
have, namely, that they bring me in the end to a point I had not imag-
ined at the beginning. 
My starting point is my sense that there is something awry in the 
way we in the law talk both about race in general and about affirma-
tive action in particular, something simply missing, or misrepresented. 
The legal arguments and judicial opinions I read have in general a 
smooth and plausible and honorable feel, but I have a nagging sense of 
something deeply wrong, as deeply wrong perhaps as what Twain dis-
covered in his own way of imagining the world. I cannot prove that I 
am right, or even say with any clarity why I feel as I do, or what it is 
that is missing or wrong. This Essay, then, is thus really a tentative ex-
ploration of an intuition, and I suppose it will be of interest, if any, 
only to those who in some way share both that intuition and the sense 
that it cannot yet be quite articulated. 
A word about the genre of this Essay. It will contain some factual 
assertions, some analytic points, some normative judgments, but it is 
meant to be something different from the sum of these elements and 
not reducible to them. You might say it is about the way I - and we 
- imagine certain things: our history, especially our racial history; the 
role of race today, especially the racial line between those we call 
white and black; the point of affirmative action, especially in the uni-
versity. Since race is not a biological but a cultural fact, I shall be ex-
ploring an aspect of our culture, and its history, from the point of view 
of a participant in it. This kind of work has an ineradicably personal 
element, for our imaginings are always individual as well as shared. I 
am trying to say how things really look to me, and this is a function of 
my own experience and capacity and perception. It is necessarily the 
case that they will look somewhat different to others, and this is all to 
the good.5 As a matter of form, the first half of the Essay will develop 
5. What I am trying to say here is difficult to articulate. An analogy might help. If you 
look at a series of great portraits, say by Rembrandt, or of facial studies that are not formally 
portraits, say by Vermeer, you naturally find yourself trying to understand the person whose 
image is before you. This is a matter of reading tiny signs in the face - evidence of tension 
in the cheek or of quizzicality in a partly raised eyebrow or of petulance or resistance in the 
curve of a lip. If the painter has done his job well you have a sense of the person as real, with 
depth and complexity and a character you can begin to grasp. For him to do this, the painter 
has to master, perhaps without ever being able to make his knowledge explicit, the ways we 
read faces of real people in the world. This is a capacity we all have; it is one way we decide 
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the intuition I spoke of above, asking the reader whether or not he or 
she shares my perceptions; the second half will identify certain conse-
quences that might flow from this intuition if it were shared. 
My fundamental point in casting the Essay as I do is to claim that 
even to ask the question of how we think of race in the law is to draw 
attention to an act specifically of the imagination; and that thinking 
about race has some of the features of narrative, including the presen-
tation of characters against a background, engaged in a sequence of 
events for which a meaning is claimed - and often a meaning that 
works as something of a surprise. 
I am speaking here of the problem of white talk about race, since 
for these purposes legal talk is white talk.6 For decades, even centu-
ries, American blacks and Asians and Hispanics and others have tried 
to tell the story of race as they experience it, often with great elo-
quence and with considerable effect on particular readers, but with 
very little effect on the law, or on the way most lawyers and judges 
think. In a modest way I am trying to say something brief, from my 
own perspective as a white person, about what I see when I look at the 
world of race and at the way we in the law talk about it.7 
III. 
As David Luban suggests in his contribution to the Symposium I 
mentioned8 - an essay comparing Walker v. Birmingham9 with Martin 
Luther King's Letter from Birmingham Jail1° - narrative works at the 
public or political level as well as the local and particular. Indeed, a 
part of every lawyer's task is to tell the story of the law - including, 
when appropriate, the history of the nation and its culture - as well as 
whether to trust or mistrust another, or form our expectations about their intelligence or 
sense of humor. Yet I at least cannot render this knowledge explicit. This is real knowledge, 
but it lives at the line between the conscious and the subconscious, available as a ground for 
action but not as the stuff of intellectual analysis. 
I think our perceptions of race, and what it means, work in much this way, intuitively, in-
stantaneously, felt not as conclusions reached from evidence but as direct registers of the 
world. They are simultaneously created by our inarticulate beliefs - expectations, larger 
understandings - and create such beliefs, all at a level that is only partly available to the 
conscious mind. This is in a sense where race happens; and in the first part of this Essay I try 
to say something about what I perceive in myself and others in this dimension of life. 
6. Of course there have been crucial contributions made by black lawyers and judges, 
but these have necessarily been contributions to a discourse largely shaped and maintained 
by whites. 
7. Sometimes I will use the word "we" deliberately to mean "we white people," some-
times more inclusively. I hope the context will make clear which use I intend. 
8. David Luban, Difference Made Legal: The Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 
2152 (1989). 
9. 389 U.S. 894 (1967). 
10. M.L. KING, Letter From Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 77 (1963). 
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the particular story of his or her client, and to do so in a way that both 
makes sense of the relevant material in each dimension and also pro-
duces an essential coherence between the two stories themselves. This 
means that some of the problems and opportunities of narrative are 
present whenever the lawyer speaks, including about the law and its 
history. 
Here is one highly reduced and familiar version of our national 
story about the racial line between white and black: once we had racial 
slavery; then we had the Civil War; then we had the great Civil War 
Amendments, prohibiting slavery, protecting the right to vote against 
racial discrimination, and prohibiting all the states of the Union from 
denying any person "equal protection of the laws"; then we had 
Reconstruction, and its abandonment in 1877; then we had Plessy and 
Jim Crow; then we had Brown; then we had the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race, not only 
against blacks but anyone, and finally the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 
It all makes up a story of gradual amelioration. The large constitu-
tional question still before us, especially with respect to affirmative ac-
tion, is what the language of "equal protection" is to mean. 
The well-known judicial discourse that the Supreme Court has 
fashioned to give meaning to this language maintains that the central 
evil against which it is directed is what we call "racial discrimination," 
and that any state action that distributes benefits or burdens, or oth-
erwise regulates, on the basis of race will be subject to what in the jar-
gon of the day is called "strict scrutiny." This in turn means that a clas-
sification based on race will be upheld only if it is "necessary" to the 
protection of a "compelling" state interest. Where the alleged vice is 
discrimination on the grounds of something other than race, but still 
presumptively improper - alienage, gender, perhaps some day sexual 
orientation - the classification is subject to a less severe but still sub-
stantial form of scrutiny. A similar analysis employs similar degrees of 
scrutiny when a state regulation interferes with a right thought to be 
more or less "fundamental," such as the right to vote or travel. Where 
no such suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, the 
state can do pretty much as it will, so far as the Fourteenth 
Amendment is concerned, subject only to the requirement that there 
be a "rational relation" between the regulation in question and a valid 
state interest. This is a system of thought and law that is meant to be 
rational, coherent, comprehensive, and neutral. 
What of the case where a state uses racial classifications in an ef-
fort to benefit races that were previously disadvantaged by the law, for 
example in ensuring that a certain percentage of public contracts go to 
minority businesses, or in using racial identity as a factor in admitting 
students to public universities? The courts have for the most part 
analyzed these cases in the now-traditional way, by asking whether the 
action in question is "necessary" to advance a "compelling state inter-
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est." Both halves of the test are used in turn to attack such programs: 
opponents argue they serve no compelling state interest and that, even 
if they do, race-based classifications are not necessary to achieve it. On 
the other side, proponents deny these propositions, asserting for ex-
ample a compelling state interest in the educational value of "diver-
sity" and claiming that it can only be attained by affirmative action in 
admissions. The ensuing arguments are lengthy, passionate, and re-
petitive. 
This way of talking seems to me, as I said above, to be awry, to 
miss - or miscast - something crucial, and my question is what that 
is. Where have we gone wrong? My own sense is that a surprisingly 
large part of the problem lies in the extreme generality and abstract-
ness of the language of analysis summarized above. 
A. 
At the most basic level, for example, I think there is something 
profoundly wrong with the use of the generic terms "race" and "mi-
nority" in the system of thought described above. For, at least as I per-
ceive it, the situation of African Americans in our country is unique 
and makes unique claims upon us. I think black people have suffered a 
qualitatively different kind of discrimination from any other minority 
or race, and continue to do so. Of course it is also true that, particu-
larly in certain regions of the country, the definition of other groups by 
what we call their race - including Mexican Americans, Puerto 
Ricans, Chinese Americans, Japanese Americans, Native Americans 
- has become foundational for a part of our society, with much of the 
viciousness that racism entails, including material deprivation, legal 
disadvantage, social degradation, and psychological oppression.11 And 
immigrants to this country frequently find themselves placed in racial 
boxes they did not know existed, with puzzling and damaging conse-
11. For an account of the relations among blacks, Mexicans, and poor whites in the 
Texas cotton belt, see NEIL FOLEY, THE WHITE SCOURGE (1997). For an analysis of the role 
of "whiteness" in our culture, see DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF 
WHITENESS (1994). THOMAS HOLT, THE PROBLEM OF RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000) 
is very good on tracing the deep continuities in racial attitudes and experiences that are 
at work beneath evident changes. For further current data, see Harvard Civil Rights Project, 
Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Desegregation, quoted in N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 2000, at A12, and Richard Morris & Michael H. Cottman, Discrimination's 
Lingering Sting, WASH. POST, June 22, 2001, at Al. Three other notes from newspapers 
I read while preparing this Essay: (1) a study of 300,000 car loans by a Vanderbilt professor, 
Mark A. Cohen, shows that blacks consistently pay more than whites, regardless of their 
credit histories, see Car Study Suggests Dealer Bias, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 10, 2001, 
available at http://vanderbilt.directtrak.com/fetch/index.cfm?n=35&s=99&o=33&c=143824&t 
=ll&e=5264; (2) John Flesher, Black Prison Population Out of Proportion, ANN ARBOR 
NEWS, Aug. 1, 2001, at B4, reports that blacks make up 14% of the population of Michigan 
but 50% of the prison population; (3) the Texas Defender Service reports that Texas has 
never executed a white person for the murder of a black person, see Bob Herbert, Tainted 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2001, at A13. 
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quences.12 In what I say here, I do not mean in any way to disregard 
the experience of such groups or to minimize their claims. But I do 
think that the maltreatment of African Americans has been distinctive 
in its duration, its intensity, its legalization, and its ideology, and that 
honesty requires us to admit that this is so. 
This is obviously no accident, for the present condition of African 
Americans is at least in part a consequence of their experience in our 
collective past, namely their forced subjection to a legalized form of 
slavery that was designed to destroy their cultures, their dignity, and 
their sense of humanity. 
This is a moral as well as an historical fact, with unique moral con-
sequences, for American human slavery was one of the greatest crimes 
ever committed by one people against another.13 And this is not just 
my judgment, or ours; it was a national judgment, reached in the most 
painful possible way. Slavery was, as Lincoln said, "somehow the 
cause" of our incredibly devastating Civil War - 620,000 dead14 out of 
a population of thirty million - and after victory the status of African 
Americans was the subject of the three great Civil War Amendments. 
The situation of African Americans is thus distinctive not only socio-
logically but historically, morally, and - of enormous consequence for 
legal talk about affirmative action - constitutionally. The use of the 
words "race" and "minority" as though these terms were universals 
12. See, e.g., RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY 
OF ASIAN AMERICANS (rev. ed. 1998). 
13. Human slavery in our country - unlike Greek and Roman slavery, for example -
was not merely a deprivation of liberty, or a system of forced labor, but a totalizing program 
of dehumanization aimed at destroying the sense that those subject to it were in any full 
sense human beings. They were denied the right to marry, to maintain families, to read, to 
meet or talk with people from the larger world, and so on, with the aim of reducing them to 
a condition that by a hideous tautology would justify the system of slavery itself: since we 
had made them little more than animals they could be treated as animals. For a collection of 
relevant materials, see J.B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 439-512. 
I am speaking here of the object and aim of slavery; the fact that those subject to it were 
able to maintain their humanity, wit, and wisdom was one of the great achievements of the 
human spirit. See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLA YES 
MADE (1976). For a summary of the world of slavery from which the American version de-
rived, see David Brion Davis, Looking at Slavery from Broader Perspectives, 105 AM. HIST. 
REV. 452 (2000), and David Brion Davis, Slavery - White, Black, Christian, Muslim, N.Y. 
REV. OF BOOKS, July 5, 2001, at 51-53. For an account of the practice of "convict leasing," 
which kept at least part of the population in something very like slavery until 1930, see 
Douglas A. Blackmon, From Alabama's Past, Capitalism and Racism in a Cruel Partnership, 
WALL ST. J ., July 16, 2001, at Al, reproduced as Alabama's Justice System Holds Tarnished 
History of Slave Labor, ANN ARBOR NEWS, July 22, 2001, at A3 to A6. 
I can myself remember those who opposed integration talking of blacks in exactly the 
terms I suggest, as being less than fully human, with whom association on equal terms was 
unthinkable, intermarriage an abomination. It was in part to resist this conception of who 
they were that so many escaped slaves thought it important to tell their story - to show, that 
is, that despite the ideology and the attempts of the slave-owning South to create facts con-
sistent with it, they were fully human, capable of thought and speech and feeling and imagi-
nation and moral sense, and able to write. 
14. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 854 (1988). 
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with the same significance the same in every instance simply erases the 
special sociological, historical, moral, and constitutional status of Afri-
can Americans. 
B. 
So does the word "discrimination" (or the phrase "invidious classi-
fication"). for as I suggest above I think the nature and character of 
the discrimination experienced by African Americans is different from 
any other in our national experience. In fact, although of course I can-
not prove this, I believe that for most white Americans "race" really 
rders to the line between white and black. I am limited by my own 
experience, but I have never heard anyone express towards any other 
racial group the intense fear, fascination, loathing, and contempt that 
at various stages in my lifetime I have perceived to be frequently, 
though of course not universally, directed by whites at African 
Americans. While the explicit expression of these feelings is much 
rarer than it was forty years ago, at least in the circles in which I move, 
there is something in my world that takes its place, namely meaningful 
silences, pauses, shifts in tones of voice, all expressive of a sense of an 
ontological difference, more than difference, between white and black. 
I have never observed this behavior with respect to other "races." 
I do not mean to say that members of other racial groups do not 
have horrible experiences, even to the point of torture and death, for I 
know they do. But I myself do not see the same widespread emotional 
charge, the same intensity of feeling, on the part of white people with 
respect to the "race" of other groups. For example, no other term of 
racial abuse so far as I am aware has anything remotely like the force 
of the N-word. 15 
15. The reason, I think, is that this word does not merely express _contempt or hatred; it 
is an exercise of racist power that recapitulates the experience of slavery itself. Compare 
what is so evil about the Nazis marching through Skokie: this is not merely an expression of 
hatred or revulsion, nor just the infliction of psychological or emotional harm in the form of 
forced recall of trauma, but a way of doing something, claiming the special and odious power 
of one who has successfully degraded another. For what the Nazis are saying is something 
like this: "Those with whom we identify - Hitler and his underlings - tortured and de-
stroyed and gassed and killed your families and friends, and we are glad they did. If we had 
been there we would have done the same. We triumph in your degradation." You can say in 
response that the speakers are moral monsters, sadists, crazed, evil; but you cannot make a 
comparable claim of power over them. They are like the child-rapist and murderer who 
smirks at the parents of his victim, still affirming his pleasure in his crime and his immunity 
to any moral claims. To it there is no answer. Likewise, the N-word says: "Our people en-
slaved and degraded and tortured yours, and we are glad they did. We triumph in your deg-
radation." It is a taunt to which there is no possible response. "Honky" does not do it. 
To put it more generally: after Hitler's extermination program one cannot engage in 
antisemitic speech without affirming that crime and identifying with its perpetrators; like-
wise, one cannot use the N-word without affirming the crime upon which it depends for its 
force, and identifying with its perpetrators. 
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I can remember that in the fifties white people opposed to racial 
equality would commonly ask more liberal-minded whites, as a kind of 
clincher, how they would like it if their daughter were to "marry one." 
The idea was of course to show that even the liberal shared the racism 
of the overt racist and should simply admit the fact and follow its logic, 
giving up his or her phony claims to moral superiority. Today I never 
hear anyone ask that question, which would generally be regarded as 
unacceptable. But I think that if this barrier of manners were over-
come, and you did ask how your white friends would feel if their child 
were to marry a Latino or Latina, an Asian American, a Native 
American, or an African American, I think that most would in fact 
have far more problematic emotional responses to the last possibility. 
Or think of the phenomenon, known all over the country, called 
"white flight." This is I think almost invariably, and certainly in its 
most intense forms, a response specifically to African Americans 
buying houses in the neighborhood in question - and it is not only 
whites who move away. Or consider areas of the country where other 
forms of racism have predominated, like the Southwest or Northwest, 
but where blacks have more or less recently moved, and ask what the 
ladder of social hierarchy looks like; I think generally one will find 
African Americans at the bottom. My own sense is that no one else 
has to face the same wall of feeling - doubt, hostility, contempt, fear 
- that black Americans face on a daily basis from their fellow citi-
zens. Faulkner captures what I mean as well as anyone when, in books 
like Absalom! Absalom!, he expresses the kind of psychological tor-
ture the white mind inflicts upon itself and others as it tries to deny the 
full humanity of those it knows are fully human. 
In sum, I think the racial line between white and black is far more 
significant in the lives of white people than any other, and if that is 
more generally true, honesty requires us to recognize that fact. 16 To 
16. I know this is a difficult and somewhat controversial point, and that it does not help 
that the person who makes it is white. What do I know of the experience of the various racial 
minorities in this country, after all, and who am I to speak to their circumstances? And sup-
pose that African Americans as a group are worse off, socially and materially: exactly how 
should that matter to Vincent Chin, say, beaten to death by a pair of thugs for being Asian, 
or to the Mexican woman living with her children in a trailer on an isolated butte in 
Colorado, without schooling or medicine or anyone who speaks her language except the boss 
who employs her family, or the American Indian child, growing up without hope, without an 
economic future, on a reservation in South Dakota? Indeed, how should it matter to the 
white family, barely surviving in desperate poverty in a West Virginia village, facing without 
help the diseases endemic to their condition? 
This is a complex set of questions, to put it mildly. I think that no one in a country this 
rich should suffer the sort of poverty that millions do - and that they do is a national em-
barrassment and disgrace - but it is also true that all of us, of all races, have a powerful in-
terest in living in a world that is as free as possible from the evils of racial thought and feel-
ing. In this connection, the violent and systematic subordination of blacks seems to me to 
have a special status in our country's life, past and present, and in our Constitution as well. 
To say this does not and should not mean blindness to other injustices. 
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put it bluntly, I think that whites are as a general matter much more 
racist in their attitudes towards blacks than any other group, and that 
this shows up in our behavior and in the social structures we fashion 
and support. To this extent the white racists of the fifties were then -
and still would be - right about the rest of us. 
All this does not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment does or 
should speak only to the relations between whites and blacks, or that 
affirmative action is proper only with respect to that group. Though I 
recognize that some of the arguments against it have force and valid-
ity, my own view is that the highly varied kind of affirmative action 
practiced at my own and other universities is a right and good thing, 
and for a range of reasons: to compensate for past deprivation and dis-
Are the purely material conditions of life in fact worse for blacks as a group than for any 
other group? This is in one sense an empirical question, and the answer to it would naturally 
depend to some degree upon the way conditions are measured - in terms of income, hous-
ing, safety, schooling, participation in government, and so on. For a sobering set of statistics, 
see Alan Hutchison, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987), 
quoted in Luban, supra note 8, at 2160. 
But there is a sense in which no conditions are purely material: the question is what they 
mean in the lives of the people who face them. (Think of the voluntary poverty of a monk or 
a nun, which is at least sometimes embraced with joy.) And the meaning of the conditions 
black people face is the work of the history to which I have been referring - the history and 
its present life in the minds of white people. 
For one account of the way in which white racism against blacks takes a physical toll on 
the body, see Sherman James's fascinating explanation of the severe difference between 
white and black hypertension. Sherman A. James, John Henryism and the Health of African 
Americans, 18 CULTURE, MED., & PSYCHIATRY 163-82 (1994); see also Rodney Clark et al., 
Racism as a Stressor for African Americans: A Biopsychosocial Model, AM. PSYCHOL., Oct. 
1999, at 805 and Chalmer E. Thompson & Helen A. Neville, Racism, Mental Health, and 
Mental Health Practice, 27 COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 155 (1999). Especially interesting to one 
concerned with affirmative action in the university is MARGARET A. GIBSON & JOHN U. 
0GBU, MINORITY STATUS AND SCHOOLING: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IMMIGRANT AND 
INVOLUNTARY MINORITIES (1991), which, as the subtitle suggests, argues that voluntary 
minorities - those who choose to come to this or another country - have a radically differ-
ent experience from indigenous or involuntary minorities. The former have made a decision 
to move; they can remember the conditions from which they escaped; and they can look 
forward to better times ahead - all of which are not available to a community that has ex-
perienced systematic and longterm oppression, especially by "race," which is a marker one 
cannot normally leave behind. 
The conditions of Native Americans are comparable in important ways to those of 
blacks. The basic indicators of prosperity in these communities are for the most part ex-
tremely low - infant mortality, life expectancy, employment, income, alcoholism and other 
addictions, income, and political power. Native Americans are classic involuntary minorities, 
having been conquered by the immensely more powerful whites, made the object of geno-
cide, and later treated shamefully. They are situated differently from blacks, however, in an-
other way, which is that while there was a white war against them, in some sense a national 
war, there was no war about this war, no collective judgment that they had been treated un-
conscionably, and no constitutional amendments based upon that judgment. They do none-
theless have a special place in our constitutional tradition. As with African Americans, their 
story is a tragic one, littered with broken promises, and it calls for a response from us. But 
our constitutional text and tradition treat Native Americans largely through structural ar-
rangements, rather than by denying, and then restoring, individual rights. Any adequate 
analysis of constitutional questions relating to affirmative action or other programs designed 
to aid Native Americans must begin with this distinctive and equally unique fact. The ar-
ticulation of such an approach is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
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crimination, at both the individual and group level; to improve the 
quality of education for all students, and teachers too; and to help 
achieve a deep change in the ways in which we relate to one another 
across what we conceive of as racial lines. To return to the virtually 
all-white university of the past would be a dreadful thing. My point is 
not to put these practices into question, but to say that in the case of 
African Americans, there is an additional and deeper justification, 
rooted both in the nature and intensity of white racism against blacks 
and in our constitutional history. 
c. 
A second, somewhat different, way in which our language of "dis-
crimination" misleads is this. In some forms, at least, this language as-
sumes that the evil against which it is directed is a kind of stereotyp-
ing, that is, a false assumption that a particular individual has a set of 
social, personal, or physical characteristics in common with the larger 
group of which he is part - that he or she is good at math or basket-
ball, or has a sense of rhythm or a hot temper. On this view the main 
vice of discrimination is that people are not judged accurately on their 
individual merits, but lumped with others with whom they do not be-
long. As an economist might say, discrimination is bad because it dis-
torts the information flow and leads to defective market judgments in 
social and commercial relations. 
This is indeed a bad thing. But it is not the heart of white racism 
against blacks, which I think is not so much a matter of cognition or 
perception as of desire. Think of what we call Jim Crow laws, for ex-
ample, prohibiting blacks from drinking at white water fountains, or 
sitting in white waiting rooms, or going to white schools. These laws 
did not rest on a mistaken lumping of the individual with his or her 
group, but had among their other aims a totally different reward for 
white people: the pleasure and satisfaction of treating other people 
like dirt, as less than you, less than human in fact, secure in the knowl-
edge that as beings without rights they presented no legal, economic, 
or physical threat.17 This is as base a desire as exists in human nature, 
17. CHARLES s. JOHNSON, GROWING UP IN THE BLACK BELT 277-80 (1941), has a list 
of interracial taboos in certain southern counties that confirm this assessment, as does the 
famous account of race relations in GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944), 
especially at 610-15. Jim Crow was of course a complex phenomenon, trading on and stimu-
lating the feelings I describe, and others too - like the sense that blacks were a source of 
contamination, with whom any intimacies were degrading for a white person - but also 
driven by domestic political interests, especially the desire of the established Democratic 
Party to consolidate its power by excluding the black voter. For this disturbing story, in-
cluding the complicity of the federal judiciary, see J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF 
SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICOONS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-
PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974); the classic, c. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE 
CAREER OF JIM CROW, (3d. rev. ed. 1974); and the fine discussion of Giles v. Harris, 189 
U.S. 475 (1903), and its background, in Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and 
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but it does exist, potentially in all human beings, and it was present 
and active in the laws I describe. And I think it is often present and ac-
tive in white responses to blacks today - including in the affirmative 
action debates, where it takes the form of superficial lament, but in-
ternal satisfaction, when "these people" prove themselves inferior 
once again. 
The feelings I describe have vastly greater consequences than most 
of our talk recognizes. Think of the way in which issues relating to the 
"inner city" or welfare or schools or crime or public health are talked 
about in our media, in political debates, and so on. I believe that just 
barely beneath the surface of these conversations is a conviction that 
what we are really talking about is black people, and that they are not 
fully people, not fully entitled to the kind of equality that is the linch-
pin of democracy.18 We know this, for our government and society sys-
tematically fail to afford poor blacks the minimal conditions for a de-
cent and healthy life. My own sense is that we would not tolerate on 
such a scale living conditions like those of many urban blacks if the 
people subject to those conditions were white, and that we do tolerate 
terrible conditions for some whites in part because to address them se-
riously would require us to do the same for blacks, and this we will not 
do. This is not a matter of stereotyping but of dehumanization, in 
some sense deliberate dehumanization, to which we - those with 
power in our country - tend to be blind, but which stands out as a 
shocking blot on our nation in the eyes of visitors. 19 The ghettoes of 
the North have taken the place of the slave quarters of the South. 
I think that the line we maintain between white and black has the 
effect of corroding or disabling our democracy in another way, for it 
divides people where other interests would seem to unite them - in-
terests in good public schools, in sensible penal policies and humane 
penal institutions, in rules concerning drugs and drug use that focus on 
education and rehabilitation instead of incarceration, in a decent pub-
lic health system, in adequate transportation, in sensible controls on 
spreading suburbs, and so on. In every one of those issues, I believe, 
one can see at work the cancer of racism, and its effect is to distort 
the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2001). For a comparative study of post-slavery re-
gimes, see FREDERICK COOPER ET AL., BEYOND SLAVERY (2000). 
18. For a fine account of this phenomenon, see DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN SANDERS, 
DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996), especially chap-
ter five, Subtle Prejudice for Modern Times; see also HOLT, supra note 11, and the Gallup 
Poll fortuitously released as I was working on this Essay (July 11, 2001), showing wide dis-
parities in black and white perceptions of our common situation and attitudes towards it. 
19. We are so accustomed to our own system of racism that it seems natural, until we 
are forced to see it with outside eyes, say those of European visitors. Or imagine this: You 
become friends with a black African while working or studying in England; you suggest that 
he or she visit America, spending a few weeks traveling then staying with you at your home 
for a couple of weeks. What would you find yourself obliged to explain to your friend about 
your country, as he or she set off alone to travel in it? 
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democracy at the most basic level by preventing the formation of ef-
fective political majorities that would otherwise exist. Race may in this 
way be the cause - or a cause - of our remarkable public heartless-
ness as a nation, all the more surprising given our private generosity.20 
D. 
A more familiar point is that the language of equal protection is 
disturbingly abstract also in the terminology of its tests: "strict scru-
tiny," "compelling interest," "necessity," "suspect classification," etc. 
One can see some of what underlies this tendency, and it is in its own 
way good: the desire for neutral, abstract principles that will not com-
mit the Court to the side of any litigant ahead of time. The ideal is to 
create a kind of elegant intellectual structure that will decide cases in 
neutral and predictable ways, perhaps with a little adjustment from 
time to time by the Court, without requiring the Court to take sides in 
important political debates or struggles. The hope is that this part of 
constitutional law will be real law, with the prestige and protection of 
universal categories and universal reason. At stake is the legitimacy of 
the Court itself, which depends upon its functioning as a legal and not 
a political agency, or so it is thought.21 
But all this turns out to be something of a fa~ade. Who, after all, is 
to decide what is a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental right" or 
a "compelling state interest,'' or whether a regulation is "necessary," 
and how are they to do so? These are not self-applying terms, and 
there is in the summary I have given, and I think in the opinions I have 
read, no coherent articulation of general purposes or values to which 
the Court could sensibly refer to give them definition. To think of this 
in the context of affirmative action cases, imagine yourself a judge 
asked to decide whether "racial diversity" offers educational benefits 
that rise to the level of a "compelling interest." How would you do 
this? 
As is well known, the definition of these terms has fluctuated, with 
the result that the law at the moment is not very far from the kind of 
interest-balancing that simply puts control of the essential questions in 
the hands of the Court and gives up all but the pretense of the kind of 
control by reason and category that underlay the effort of doctrinal 
abstraction in the first place.22 My sense is that in the end the intellec-
20. By this I mean both charitable giving, which of course goes to a wide range of bene-
ficiaries - including blacks, though I doubt to a proportionate degree - and also the far 
more local habits of neighborliness and helpfulness, which in the nature of things tend to 
benefit those closest to us. 
21. For a classic evocation of the ideals of neutrality and generality, see Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
22. For an interesting analysis of the tendency of the contemporary Court to frame its 
decisions in formulas, see ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 121-155 (1989). 
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tual structure that was meant to control and guide judicial discretion 
has to a large degree only masked it. 
Likewise, the language most often used to justify affirmative action 
in education, that of "the educational benefits of diversity," seems to 
me at once too abstract and too anemic. It is not a marginal improve-
ment in the quality of college education that is at stake, but the power 
of the state to address our gravest and deepest social evil in a sensible 
way. The proper goal is not simply diversity or variety or pluralism, 
whether of "race" or perspective or background, but a fundamental 
change in the ways in which African Americans in particular, but 
members of other races too, are imagined, indeed are encouraged to 
imagine themselves, and in the ways in which white Americans imag-
ine themselves and their past too. The goal is not better education but 
social change at the deepest level; it is not a form of reparation, but a 
change in the practical and psychological structure of our national 
life. 23 
E. 
Finally, and briefly, a word about an even narrower point, the 
common assumption that "preferential admissions" necessarily works 
to the cost of the excluded white applicants who have better creden-
tials. Think about the white high school senior, for example, who 
complains, in a way sensibly enough, that she has to worry about get-
ting into a good college, while some of her black classmates, with 
lower grades and scores, have a better chance of making it. How 
would you respond to her? Perhaps this way: Suppose, against the 
facts of history, that our fellow citizens of African descent had come 
here voluntarily and without the burdens of slavery; that they had 
been welcomed just as the Germans and English and Scots were, for 
example; and that they thus had had the opportunity to become fully 
incorporated as equal citizens, with all that entails, from education to 
property. Is it not possible that admission to college would be even 
more competitive for you than it is now? The student's complaint, in 
other words, rests on the assumption that the superiority in wealth, 
power, and culture that whites have enjoyed is the normal state of af-
fairs, which she sees affirmative action to threaten; not that the normal 
Compare Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 
943 (1987). 
23. For an argument to a similar point, see Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to 
Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative Action Debate: Bowen and Bok's The Shape of the 
River, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 284, 305 (2000). There is often an element of patronization - or 
racism, actually - built into the language of "diversity," for it assumes that its beneficiaries 
will enrich the lives of the rest of us and do so by fulfilling their function, which is to "repre-
sent their people." This is not a respectful way to talk about others, and it replicates the fun-
damental reifying assumptions of racial talk. 
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state of affairs would be actual equality between the races, which af-
firmative action is a small effort to attain.24 
This is just a small instance in which it is plain that, however op-
posed he or she may be to racial discrimination, every white person is 
in some sense - in terms of power, self-image, the right to claim no 
race at all - its beneficiary. This is of course profoundly distasteful, 
but it is true, and in our efforts to talk about this matter we should try 
to reflect that truth.25 
IV. 
If I have captured something of the way we talk about race in the 
law, especially in connection with affirmative action, and something 
too of what is wrong with it, can we find a way to do better? Is 
there any other way, in particular, in which we might think about 
an affirmative action case, say, one involving the use of racial 
categories by a state university in the admission process to ensure so 
far as possible the presence of African Americans in the student body? 
(I shall assume for the moment that the program reaches only African 
Americans, not members of other races.) 
A. 
The first step might be to think of the Civil War Amendments less 
as an effort to create neutral and universal rules of law, to be applied 
by the work of a universal reason - as is perhaps true of the Bill of 
Rights - than as an effort to address the greatest single social and po-
litical issue the nation has ever faced: human slavery and its conse-
24. Some people understandably feel resentful of public efforts to redress racial injustice 
on the grounds that their ancestors came long after slavery was over and that they and their 
families have not only not practiced racial discrimination, they have been consistently op-
posed to it. Let the descendants of slaveowners pay, perhaps, but not us, who have done 
nothing. There are several difficulties with this position, the most obvious perhaps the one 
made in the next paragraph of the text, that all white people are in fact privileged by our ra-
cial system, even if they do not wish to be. 
Compare also the person who invests today in a German corporation that used slave la-
bor in the past: some portions of the value he is acquiring is attributed to that labor, whether 
he likes it or not. Being a white person in America is like buying a house that was built by 
slaves before the Civil War. 
It is also true that slavery was not so long ago. My own great aunt, whom I remember 
meeting, was born in 1860, and I have myself known people whose parents and grandparents 
were born into slavery. Equally important, overt and legalized disenfranchisement of black 
people continued until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, well within the lifetime of many peo-
ple alive today. 
25. Is it in fact possible that the very commitment to abstraction that characterizes legal 
discourse in this field, its search for neutral categories, its erasure of what is historically and 
constitutionally special about the situation of black Americans, is partly driven without our 
knowing it by the hidden desires of racism? Cf ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: 
ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975). 
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quences, particularly the denial of full citizenship to the descendants 
of slaves. It is obvious that the Framers of these amendments saw this 
as a long process - hence the use of the constitutional amendment as 
a way to deal with it - and that they anticipated serious and system-
atic state hostility to the newly freed slaves, for it is against this danger 
that the amendments were meant to guard. The amendments were in 
large part aimed at preventing the states from interfering with the pro-
cess by which newly freed blacks, or those freed earlier, could become 
integrated into the nation as full citizens - autonomous, capable, in-
dependent.26 This is a way of conceiving of the amendments as de-
signed to achieve something specific in the world, not just as articula-
tions of general political or philosophic principles to be applied to all 
alike. 
From this perspective it would be simply bizarre to use the 
Fourteenth Amendment to strike down reasonable state efforts to 
help African Americans achieve full autonomy and integration. The 
States would be doing just what the amendments wanted them to do 
- instead of the particularly odious kind of group warfare they had 
waged against African Americans for centuries, and that many of 
them were in fact to continue to wage in different guises for another 
century at least. "Discrimination" - which sounds like a neutral term 
defining a generalized evil - in fact means something very different 
indeed when it refers to action by the white majority designed to in-
crease their domination over blacks and when it refers to action by the 
same majority designed to reduce it.27 
I am suggesting, that is, that we might think of this set of amend-
ments as being far more "result-oriented" than we usually do, as 
aimed less at the articulation of a general principle by which to test all 
state legislation than at the specific result of trying to help black 
Americans get on their feet and flourish in a world in which they faced 
constant racial opposition.28 This view is all the more compelling, to 
26. Indeed, the equal protection language could be read to require more: affirmative 
action, in fact, to protect blacks against lawlessness and violence at the hands of whites. See 
ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT (1994), especially her most interesting chapter one, Toward an Abolitionist 
Reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
27. For an elaboration of this point, see, for example, Richard Lempert, The Force of 
Irony: On the Morality of Affirmative Action and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 95 ETHICS 
85 (1984), and my discussion of Weber in J.B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, 218-22 
(1990). 
28. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), otherwise so objectionable, 
could provide a starting point, for the Court there held that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to be read not as a general grant of power to review the reasonableness or propriety of state 
legislation, but as directed to the plight of freed blacks. See J.B. White, Reading Texts, 
Reading Traditions: African Masks and American Law, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 117, 125-26 
(2000). 
The obvious counter-argument to the position taken in the text is (1) that the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not in fact compose that text in terms of race or slavery, let 
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me at least, when we consider the disgraceful period of Jim Crow and 
the Court's shameful complicity in it, during which the conditions that 
the amendments were designed to address were largely continued un-
der the force of law, including legalized disenfranchisement.29 Given 
this history, the Court ought to be extremely deferential to any sincere 
state effort to achieve, rather than frustrate, the purposes of the 
amendments. 
B. 
I also think we should reexamine the "state action" doctrine, the 
rule that the Constitution reaches discrimination only at the hands of 
the state, or one of its agents or subdivisions, not of private parties. In 
affirmative action cases the issue arises this way: the Court has agreed 
that a state agency, such as a university, may use racial classifications 
to counter the effects of its own prior unconstitutional racial discrimi-
nation (this would, that is, be a "compelling interest"); on the other 
hand, it may not act in this way to counter the effects of discrimination 
by other states, or other branches of its own state, and certainly not to 
counter the effects of what is termed "societal discrimination." There 
are two arguments at work here: first that private discrimination 
alone identify the specific condition of black Americans, and (2) that it would have been 
worse, for blacks and everyone else, had they done so, for a group-specific protection in a 
Constitution otherwise largely part cast in universalist terms would be likely to increase 
rather than reduce racial hostility. 
Of course it is a real question how the Framers' choice of general language is to be read, 
but I do not think that it precludes the reading I propose. There can be no question that it is 
the situation of blacks to which the Fourteenth Amendment is mainly directed, especially 
when it is read in connection with the Thirteenth and Fifteenth. And to say that the para-
digm the Framers had in mind should be treated with particular respect and solicitude in no 
way undermines their wish to articulate a standard that would reach other cases as well -
just as in reading the Fourth Amendment it would be right to give scrupulous though not 
exclusive attention to cases that are especially close to the writs of assistance that were the 
Framers' paradigm for improper governmental searches. My view is not that the Fourteenth 
Amendment should reach no other cases, no other people, but only to say that the special 
case of African Americans ought to be treated as the paradigm it actually was. 
The second point in the argument given above I think actually reinforces my reading. Of 
course one would not want a constitutional amendment framed in terms of one racial group, 
and for both the reasons suggested. But that very fact is one reason why the Framers might 
have composed a universalist text not out of universalist impulses, but in response to the 
dangers and evils of a particular situation. I think it would be much closer to the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in its context to read it as especially focused on the circum-
stances of blacks than to read it, as the Court now seems to, as a wholly neutral prohibition 
of the use of racial classifications without distinguishing between cases in which those classi-
fications are used to perpetuate the racial domination against which the amendment is di-
rected and those in which they are used to erode it. 
29. See especially Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), explained and analyzed well in 
Pildes, supra note 17. For a general history, see WOODWARD, supra note 17. Like Thomas 
Holt in his PROBLEM OF RACE IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 11, Woodward shows that 
in race relations as all else there are significant changes over time, some of them dramatic. 
But the accounts of both writers express a deep theme of persistent white racial hostility, 
sometimes simmering, sometimes on the boil, but always present. 
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would have been beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment 
when it occurred and thus cannot justify ameliorative action today; 
and second that societal discrimination is in any event too amorphous 
and uncertain to work as an appropriate standard for legislative ac-
tion. 30 
The view that the Constitution reaches only state action rests on 
one great textual pillar, the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment be-
gins with the language, "no state shall ... " and goes on to specify vari-
ous things, including "deny any person equal protection of the laws."31 
The state action requirement is supported as well by the nature of the 
Constitution more generally, which is of course meant to define and 
limit the powers of government, not to promulgate general rules of 
law. And it is evident that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment 
at a general level was to subject the state's treatment of the individual 
person to substantial constitutional control, which before was not the 
case - indeed it could not have been, if the Framers' original com-
promise on slavery, permitting but not mentioning it, were to survive. 
All this amounts to a strong argument for the state action require-
ment. 
But perhaps it is not completely unanswerable, especially where, as 
here, the question arises at one remove: the question is not whether 
the societal discrimination the state wishes to redress was itself a viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, but whether its private or societal 
character disqualifies it as a justification the state may now invoke to 
support its remedial policies. 
Think here of the state action question as it arose in perhaps its 
purest form, in connection with the series of "sit-in" cases in the early 
1960s. The facts were typically something like this: black activists, or 
black activists and their white supporters together, would enter a res-
taurant or store or other such establishment to request service against 
the insistence by the management that they would serve only white 
customers. The activists would be asked to leave and would refuse. 
Usually they would be prosecuted under a statute or ordinance that 
was not cast in racial terms but simply made it a crime to enter prop-
erty, or to remain on it, against the expressed will of the owner. The 
question was whether the convictions violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the obvious argument was that they did not, for the state 
was not the source of the decision to discriminate. Exclusion was a 
purely private judgment, enforced in a neutral way by the state, which 
claims that it would have acted equally energetically on behalf of a 
black restaurateur who wished to exclude white customers. The state 
30. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909 (1996). 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The seminal articulation of the state action doctrine is 
in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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would in fact have had not the slightest objection, it was said, if an 
owner of a restaurant wanted his establishment to be open to people 
of both races, or only to integrated groups. A decision for the protest-
ers, it was argued, would threaten the right of the people to make free 
choices in the most private aspects of their lives, at parties given in 
their own homes for example, or in the choice of rooming house 
boarders. 
As is well known, the Court found technical ways to reverse these 
convictions without directly facing the state action question, in this 
way putting pressure on Congress to deal with the issue, which it did in 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act. This statute was premised mainly on the 
commerce power of the Congress, rather than the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and therefore no substantial state action question was 
presented. The new antidiscrimination law was conceptualized, in 
other words, not as the reversal of a state policy on race but simply as 
the regulation of a certain part of the economy, which under the ex-
pansive readings of the commerce power in the New Deal cases was 
practically the entire thing. 
But suppose that Congress had not acted. Is it obvious that these 
convictions were beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
An argument that they were not could begin with the fact that the line 
between state and private action, especially in connection with racial 
discrimination, is by no means as clear as the doctrine suggests. First, 
consider the fact that in any of the Southern states, and some of the 
Northern ones, every act of so-called private discrimination occurring 
during the first half of the twentieth century would have had the sup-
port of official declarations from every branch of the state government 
- executive, legislative, and judicial.32 When a state says that its policy 
is to segregate the races in every feasible way,33 in what sense are pri-
vate acts consistent with this policy merely private acts? It is impossi-
ble for me to believe that the governmental policies and declarations 
did not have substantial reinforcing, perhaps guiding, effect. One task 
and hope of the law is to shape culture, and that means to reach pri-
vate action; when the law deliberately reinforces a racist culture it may 
32. See, for example, the summary of Louisiana law in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 
157, 178-81 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
33. For one judicial statement of the policy of racial subordination, see Nairn v. Nairn, 
87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955): 
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, or in any other 
provision of that great document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the State 
from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens, or which denies the 
power of the State to regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a mongrel breed 
of citizens. We find there no requirement that the State shall not legislate to prevent the 
obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even though it weaken 
or destroy the quality of its citizenship. 
Id. at 756. 
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perhaps be held accountable for conduct beyond that which it specifi-
cally requires or prohibits. The fact that there is no state policy with 
respect to lunchrooms, for example, would hardly undo the effect of 
the state's bold and unrelenting commitment to the principle of black 
inferiority and the separation of the races. 
A more radical way to connect the state with "private" action was 
suggested by Justice Douglas in the sit-in cases, when he said that cus-
tom could be law and hence "state action" for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.34 His idea I think was that when one group, 
in this case whites motivated by racial animosity towards blacks, have 
such a practical monopoly of private and public power that they may 
simply choose whether to achieve their objectives through the arms of 
the state or through concerted private action, it ought not matter 
which form of power they elect to use. In other words, when a group is 
so dominant that it can use the agencies of the state if it chooses, its 
extragovernmental actions ought not be immune from all constitu-
tional co.nsideration simply because it chose to act "privately."35 
In support of Justice Douglas's approach, consider the fact that in 
its origins slavery was to a large degree private, not public. Slavery 
emerged as a private practice, mainly in the Southern states, presuma-
bly with the approval of those with power in the community; only once 
34. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 365 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 179-81 (1961). A more familiar argument focused on the 
character of restaurants, hotels, lunchrooms, and the like, as businesses "affected with a 
public interest." Under ancient common law they had an obligation to serve all people at fair 
prices. Of course, the fact that the common Jaw has this principle does not mean that it is 
automatically a principle of constitutional Jaw, but Douglas used it to provide a language, a 
set of instances and ideas, by which the Fourteenth Amendment could reach some "private" 
judgments to discriminate without reaching all - the restaurant but not the social club. 
When one adds the fact that these facilities are heavily regulated by the state, the argument 
that they are quasi-public becomes still stronger. On the other hand, this way of thinking 
would seem to make the restaurants or other businesses "state actors" for all purposes, 
meaning that other provisions of the Constitution would apply to them - for example the 
Establishment Clause, which would arguably make it unconstitutional for the restaurant 
owner to display a religious symbol or text on the wall of his restaurant. 
35. Reasoning like this was also at work in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), which 
held that "private" political primaries were subject to constitutional limitations (though that 
case could presumably be limited to instances where the supposedly private parties were car-
rying out public functions). One could also invoke here by analogy the arguments against 
excessive formalism in corporate law made by Nina Mendelson, A Control-Based Approach 
to Shareholder Liability, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1203 (2002). 
Unlike the "affected with a public interest" rationale, Douglas's primary approach to 
what is involved when a private business acts to maintain white domination over blacks 
would not make those businesses state actors for all purposes, but only when they are acting 
to reinforce the evil against which the amendment is directed. In this sense, it is another 
move away from abstraction to address the particularity of our situation. This is all an argu-
ment for the rejection of the now-standard way of thinking about "state action" - by the 
degree of "entwinement" between the "state" and the "private actor" - whenever the issue 
is the perpetuation of white domination of blacks. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Sec-
ondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (2001) (affirming Metro. Edison., 419 U.S. 345 
(1974)). 
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so established did it become expressly legalized, through legislative 
and judicial action. Indeed, the most comprehensive and draconian 
slave codes were not promulgated until the middle years of the nine-
teenth century, almost 200 years after the beginning. Slavery was a 
product of the common law, a legalization of social practice, a fact that 
lends support to the idea that social practices born out of slavery 
might be within the ambit of the Constitution. A fusion of the private 
and the public is built into the history of slavery and racial discrimina-
tion alike. 
This is recognized in the Constitution itself, for the Thirteenth 
Amendment, prohibiting slavery, has no state action language at all, 
but simply says: 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within 
the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.36 
This amendment makes human slavery the proper object of federal 
concern even if it receives no support whatever from agencies of the 
state. A federal statute accordingly makes it a crime to treat another 
person as a slave, without any requirement that the state (or federal) 
government in any way support or involve itself in that slavery.37 
When one recognizes that the sorts of discrimination and abuse to 
which the descendants of slaves in this country have been regularly 
subjected are, as a cultural and factual matter, an effort to maintain 
the view of the world and of other human beings that underlay slavery, 
to perpetuate it in another form, it may not be as much of a stretch as 
it first appears to hold that the Constitution speaks to systematic ra-
cism in the private as well as the public sector - or, to use the lan-
guage of Plessy v. Ferguson,38 that it aims at "social" as well as "politi-
cal" equality. 
This argument has special force wherever agencies of the state 
have in the past supported racism, and it is even more plausible where 
- as is true in affirmative action cases - the question is not whether 
"private conduct" or "societal discrimination" is itself subject to judi-
cial regulation under the Constitution but only whether a state may 
constitutionally base remedial action upon it, as a legacy of the slavery 
against which the amendments are specifically directed.39 In this con-
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 1. 
37. 18 U.S.C.A. 77, § 1584 (West Supp. 1994): "Whoever knowingly and willfully holds 
to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of involuntary servitude, any other per-
son for any term, or brings within the United States any person so held, shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both." 
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
39. Justice Douglas told the story briefly in Bell v. Maryland: "The Black Codes were a 
substitute for slavery; segregation was a substitute for the Black Codes; the discrimination in 
these sit-in cases is a relic of slavery." 378 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1964). 
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text the second argument mentioned above, that societal discrimina-
tion is too amorphous to serve as a ground for state action, seems very 
weak. Insofar as the states are themselves trying in a genuine and ra-
tional way to address the problem of racial injustice to which the 
amendments were themselves directed, their efforts should be ap-
plauded and supported, not undermined, by the Court, and the rest of 
us.40 
c. 
One of the difficulties faced by those who defend affirmative ac-
tion programs is that of explaining exactly why one racial or ethnic 
group is included, another excluded. The trial judge in the University 
of Michigan Law School case said, for example, that the School had no 
principled way of explaining why it singled out African Americans, 
Mexican Americans, Native Americans, and Puerto Ricans raised on 
the U.S. mainland.41 If the idea is to remedy past discrimination that 
has resulted in under-representation in the legal profession, as some 
programs put it,42 Polish people would certainly seem to have a claim. 
And why only Latinos and Latinas who are Mexican in origin? Why 
only mainland-raised Puerto Ricans? And how about Asian 
Americans, a category that includes an enormous diversity with re-
spect both to prior national and cultural background and to present-
day economic and social status? The language of "diversity,'' as I said 
above, seems simply too weak to deal with the imperatives presented 
by the special circumstances of African Americans, and it leads to dis-
tinctions that are hard to explain or defend. My own sense is that af-
firmative action programs, in some sense originally based on special 
moral and political claims of blacks, have been extended in a way that 
both makes them harder to explain and justify and ends up diluting 
and obscuring the claims of blacks themselves.43 As I say above, "di-
versity" does not in my view express what is at stake in the state's ef-
fort to address the situation of African Americans. 
40. In this field, as in some others, it would in fact be highly desirable to take advantage 
of our federal system and permit different states to try different programs and methods, with 
the thought that we all might learn something from the process. 
41. "Certainly other groups have also been subjected to discrimination, such as Arabs 
and southern and eastern Europeans, to name but a few .... " Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 
F.Supp.2d 821, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
42. See, for example, the University of Colorado Law School program, quoted (anony-
mously) in THE LEGAL IMAGINATION, supra note 3, at 386-87. 
43. See the minority set-aside program at issue in City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 
469 (1989), where "minority group members" included "Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, 
Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts." Id. at 478. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, con-
demned in particular the inclusion of the last two groups, on the grounds that they have had 
virtually no representation in Richmond's population and therefore cannot legitimately be 
entitled to remedying of past discrimination. Id. at 506. 
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How, then, should we think about affirmative action? I think a line 
can be drawn that distinguishes between African Americans and all 
others, for the reasons I have been setting forth from the beginning of 
this Essay. Rather than strict scrutiny, a very high degree of judicial 
deference should be paid to sensible and responsible attempts by the 
state to address what is in my view at least the most serious of all our 
social and moral problems: racial oppression of blacks. In the univer-
sity context, this would include not only the judgment to admit 
African Americans who would not, on other criteria, be admitted to 
universities, but also a decision to spend time and money to help them 
to succeed there. 
As for other groups, the rationale of diversity, supported by the 
desire to redress prior and present patterns of discrimination, does 
make sense to me. Without the special case of African Americans, 
such a program could be far less race-dependent than it now is, far 
more focused on the particular experience and situation of individual 
applicants. If diversity of background and experience and outlook is 
the goal, and I think it is a fine one, then a university ought to be in-
terested on these grounds in a bluecollar white man, a fundamentalist 
Christian woman, a Hasidic Jew, a Sikh or Hindu, a man or woman 
from the barrio in Los Angeles, a farm worker's child, a person who 
grew up as the only Asian American in her town in Georgia, a woman 
who worked during college in a pregnancy clinic in southeast 
Washington, an Ojibwe man from the White Earth reservation in 
Minnesota, and so on. The burdens or handicaps faced by any of these 
people should be relevant to their admission, including those based 
upon the fact that others regard them as belonging to a "race" differ-
ent from the "white race." And if a state, or its universities, did con-
clude that the circumstances of some other race made claims as a 
group comparable to those of blacks - based on past or present dep-
rivation, discrimination, or oppression - I think the courts should 
give considerable weight to such a determination too. All of this could 
be done far more honestly and intelligibly if the special core case of 
the African Americans were recognized as distinctive and treated ac-
cordingly. 
Obviously, I support affirmative action on the merits, especially for 
blacks. But I should stress that the two shifts in doctrine I have sug-
gested - (1) reading the Fourteenth Amendment as focusing espe-
cially on protecting blacks against the organized hostility of whites, 
and (2) proposing a revision of the state action doctrine along the lines 
suggested by Justice Douglas - would not result in a constitutional 
obligation that the states adopt affirmative action programs in univer-
sity or other contexts. These programs are on the merits highly con-
troversial and contested, and while I am strongly disposed to favor 
them, I also recognize that rational - if in my view erroneous - ar-
guments can be made against them. These arguments may be cast in 
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terms of fairness to white applicants, the importance of neutral stan-
dards of intellectual achievement and capacity, the claim of damage 
done to the intended beneficiaries of the program, or the improper 
omission of whites who have suffered economic and other forms of 
deprivation. In my view, the States would be constitutionally entitled 
to be persuaded by these arguments, disagree with them on the merits 
though I do. My main point here is very different, having to do with 
the attitude the Supreme Court - and lower courts, too - should 
take towards a state agency that has considered these matters, heard 
arguments both ways, and come to the conclusion that such a program 
is a wise and good thing. Given the aims of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the shameful history of the nation - including state 
and federal courts - since that time, I think the Court has no business 
"strictly scrutinizing" reasonable state efforts to advance the purposes 
of the Civil War Amendments, but should instead be glad that the 
state has assumed the kind of responsibility it has and defer to its ra-
tional judgments. 
Race - and by this I mean the socially-defined line between 
whites and blacks - is the ultimate taken-for-granted of our culture; 
we maintain it, both in our official and in our unofficial behavior, as I 
in fact have been doing throughout this article. It is a continuing badge 
of slavery. So long as it exists, the Court should display, at the very 
least, a tolerant attitude towards state efforts to end the evils it has 
produced. 
D. 
One more point, which brings us back to Huckleberry Finn and its 
implication of the white reader in the racism that is its subject. Built 
into the argument at every stage so far is the belief that people are in 
fact of different races. Everyone knows that whites are one thing, 
blacks another. Intermarriage is of course possible, but again, every-
one knows that the child of such a marriage is black, not white. Yet it 
is perfectly plain that race is not a natural or biological fact. 44 Surely 
the social rule regarding children of mixed marriages - that they are 
"black," not "white" - is a demonstration that race is an arbitrary so-
cial and legal construct; a system of racism could with equal plausibil-
ity hold the opposite, that one drop of the blood of the master race en-
titled a person to all the privileges of that status. Many of the physical 
features we associate with "race," such as skin color and facial features 
are inherited separately, not as a package. And similarity in skin color 
may in fact not represent a common ancestry, but a parallel adaptation 
to similar conditions on the part of distant populations. If you turn to 
44. For a good introduction to this issue, see STEPHAN MOLNAR, HUMAN VARIATION, 
RACES, TYPES, AND ETHNIC GROUPS (2d. ed. 1983). 
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genetic studies of race, you find that Africans have greater genetic 
variation than other populations - think of the towering and thin 
Masai compared to the short pygmies, for example, and the enormous 
variation in head shape and facial features among in habitants of that 
continent. This makes it exceedingly odd to think of Africans as a 
single race. But we whites tend not to see these differences, or not to 
see them clearly, because in our minds they are less significant than 
the single criterion of skin color. This is what it means to have a mind 
shaped by the ideology or race: to think that the differences we choose 
to observe are real and natural. 
E. 
Finally, I wish to draw attention to another feature of the language 
of race, and a source of its power, namely, that it creates a connection, 
a web of identity and responsibility in fact, between people who have 
not chosen each other and are not related by blood or marriage. Thus, 
when a black man steals or rapes or kills, white people tend to look to 
black people, or at least black men, in a demanding or at least ques-
tioning way: "What have you to say about that? You people are .... " 
But by what warrant do we whites do that? The person we implicitly 
address, or hold responsible, has no more real relation with the crimi-
nal than we do. Think how differently gender works. I suppose a vast 
majority of violent crimes are committed by males, but it is not com-
mon to see the acts of one male attributed to all. Our culture does not 
draw among men the kind of connection that it regularly draws among 
those defined by race, especially African Americans. 
The language of race in this context, white against black, works 
like the language of war. Its logic is the same as that by which a nation 
at war holds all of the enemy people responsible for what any of them 
does. In the case of war, this feature of the language has a dreadful but 
real purpose: it enables us to deny the humanity that unites us with the 
people on the other side, a denial that is necessary for war to go on at 
all. It is what enables a person to drop incendiary bombs on Tokyo or 
Dresden or London or Baghdad. The psychological cost of this denial 
is enormous, for it is obviously false, but, as I say, it is necessary to the 
existence of war, to which we must look for any justification. 
That our language of race works like a language of war is no acci-
dent, since its origins were as a language of war, a language that would 
justify the war of whites against blacks - their seizure, sale, and total 
subjugation, by torture and murder if necessary. 
This may explain a feeling I have had about Brown v. Board of 
Education,45 that it was a victory like a martial victory, a triumph over 
an enemy - and hence that it was entirely beside the point to agonize 
45. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
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about whether it treated with appropriate "neutrality" the conflict be-
tween the white desire for segregation and the black desire for integra-
tion.46 There is a real sense in which the Civil War did not end at 
Appomattox, but continued, with African Americans as its continued 
victims, at least for another century. As a white Northerner in the 
fifties, I can remember feeling with great self-righteousness that the 
evil against which Brown was directed was specifically and exclusively 
a Southern one, a remnant of the war in fact. In those days "Yankee" 
and "Rebel" were still terms of ordinary speech, and I think my own 
feelings about Brown, though I only recognized this recently, were 
those of victory, victory in a war - one that would require further ac-
tion, of course, for the war was not yet entirely won, but a decisive vic-
tory nonetheless. 
It also explains something else, for me at least. I was myself raised 
to believe that the language of race drew lines among human beings 
that ought never to be drawn. The inference I drew was that race is a 
topic on which one should never speak. To refer to another person's 
race in their presence was an ultimate rudeness; to do so in their ab-
sence a kind of dishonesty. When the issue of affirmative action first 
arose in my life, very early in my teaching years at the University of 
Colorado, I argued strenuously that it ought to be race-neutral, and 
that it should speak instead of hardship, deprivation, oppression, on 
the view that these were ultimately individual matters. I think what I 
was seeing, without quite knowing it, was that the language of race 
was the language of war, and I thought it should never be used. But I 
now think this was and is an impossible principle: race is in fact cre-
ated by our society, and given meaning, and we cannot deny this. We 
have to use the language, bad as it is. 
The days of Brown, and the early days of affirmative action, too, 
were days of innocence of course. We can now begin to see, even 
Northerners like me, what Lincoln told us in his Second Inaugural, 
that this is and was one nation, with one history and one great defining 
national "offense," to use his and the Bible's word, in which all white 
people and the state itself are implicated. The true story is that the evil 
of racial thought is not Southern but national, and the battle of today 
is not between geographic regions but within our hearts. Yet all this 
suggests that the nomenclature of the Civil War Amendments has 
more relevance than is commonly recognized, and not only as a matter 
of the context in which they were promulgated and adopted. They 
speak to a civil war that still rages in our society, in our schools, in our 
selves, and they should be so interpreted.47 I think it is the right, the 
46. See Wechsler, supra note 21. 
47. The fact that racial language is in its origins and nature a language of war helps ex-
plain a peculiar feature of its use, namely that the question who is to be included within each 
group becomes highly problematic in a range of circumstances and is often highly contested. 
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only thing for the Court to recognize that white racism is the continua-
tion of a war against our fellow citizens, defined by "race," and that as 
an evil of this kind, it calls for responses that rest on the great pur-
poses of the Civil War itself and the amendments it made possible, 
certainly to the extent of adopting an attitude of respect and defer-
ence, indeed thankfulness, towards every reasonable effort of the state 
to bring that war to an end. 
* * * 
This Essay has been my effort to say, in very brief compass, some-
thing about the way I see race imagined and acted on in our world, 
and in the law. For me the abstract and supposedly neutral language of 
legal analysis is hopelessly inadequate to the facts of our situation, in-
cluding: our history of over two hundred years of a deliberately de-
grading racial slavery, the significance of our Civil War and the 
amendments that gave its achievement shape, the meaning of the next 
century of state violence and oppression against blacks, and the con-
tinuing neglect and contempt to which blacks are subject. Its use of the 
general categories of "race" and "discrimination" and "diversity" 
draw attention away from the special claims blacks may properly 
make on the institutions of this society, and indeed from the special 
histories of other racial groups as well. 
When Mark Twain finds himself imagining more and more fully 
the relation between Huck and Jim as a relation between human be-
ings - a relation of love and redemption, in fact, for Jim saves Huck 
not only pragmatically but psychologically - he brings simultaneously 
into the circle of attention the moral impossibility of racial thought 
and its unavoidability. We are now in truth situated much as he was 
then. There is no easy way to imagine ourselves out of the world of 
deep and violent injustice we have created, and that we recreate every 
day. But that is our task, and we shall have a much better chance of 
doing something right and valuable if we can find ways of talking and 
thinking, ways of telling our national story, that will do justice to its 
meaning. 
For this is a characteristic of the language of war as well: Are you one of "them," that is, one 
of the enemy whom we regard ourselves as justifiably killing? Or are you too young or too 
sick or too weak or too old, or too much at odds with government, to count? The conse-
quences are enormous but the line uncertain. So, too, with respect to race: Are you really 
"black," hence (1) subject to slavery or (2) entitled to make claims based on a history of 
slavery? Are you really "white," hence in some way responsible for this history, or a benefi-
ciary of it? And so on. 
